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Committees are deferred to, and that deference is reciprocated.
There is, however, a troublesome quality to this consensus. The items in this list (and there could undoubtedly be more) describe or label committee power, but they do not explain it. Explanations of these empirical regularities require a theory. In the case of each of these stylized facts, that is, a theory is needed to determine why things are done this way. In many cases it is insufficient to refer to institutional rules because many of the practices alluded to above either are not embodied in the rules at all or have evolved from them only slowly. It is therefore necessary to begin the theoretical analysis from first principles.
There is an added advantage to a theory that begins with first principles: although formulated to accommodate some stylized facts, such a theory will yield new implications so that it may be employed as a discovery procedure. Consider some anomalies that the theory we formulate below can explain:
In a bicameral system, how is it possible that change in the composition of a committee or a majority in one chamber is sufficient to lead to policy change (Weingast and Moran 1983)? Why are explicit procedures in the House of Representatives to diminish the gatekeeping monopoly of committees (specifically the discharge petition) rarely employed; and when they are employed, why do they rarely result in law? How is it that committees maintain their influence over policy change when, once they "open the gates" by bringing forth a proposal, majorities can work their will in ways potentially unacceptable to the proposing committee? Why do members appear to defer to committees, even to the point of defeating amendments to committee proposals that have clear majority support?
Our explanation for these stylized facts and anomalies emphasizes the enforcement of agreements and arrangements. The legislative world is one in which agreements are forged among autonomous agents. But it is a world lacking instruments or institutions that exogenously enforce such agreements (Axelrod 1981 (Axelrod , 1984 Laver 1981) . Agreements and arrangements, therefore, are subject to cheating, reneging, and dissembling. When an arrangement persists over long periods-long enough to allow students to regard it as a relatively robust empirical regularity-then either it is cheatproof and self-enforcing, in the sense that no one has any motive to depart from the arrangement, or there exists a, sometimes subtle, endogenous enforcement mechanism. Although the logic of selfenforcement may apply, we believe that there is much to be learned from a theory incorporating explicit enforcement mechanisms.
In our view, the explanation of committee power resides in the rules governing the sequence of proposing, amending, and especially of vetoing in the legislative process. We demonstrate a surprisingly important role for the last stage of the legislative process, the conference procedure, in which bicameral differences are resolved. The ex post adjustment power conferred on committees in this forum provides them with subtle yet powerful means to affect the voting and proposing power of other members on the floor during the earlier legislative stages. Indeed, we show that the deference given committees on the floor is a natural consequence of the ex post adjustment powers wielded by committees in conference.
In the first section of this paper we briefly describe some alternative theoretical explanations of committee power. In each instance, we make explicit what we regard as the kernel of truth it contains, but we also point out crucial missing elements that ultimately render it incomplete. We provide the basic concepts of our own explanatory framework in the second section. In the next two sections, we develop the logic of committee enforcement emphasizing the importance of the manner in which the various stages of legislative deliberation are sequenced. In the fifth and sixth sections we provide both theoretical and empirical detail on the institutionalization of enforcement in the conference committee procedure. In the last section we pull our arguments together and address some extensions and applications.
Theoretical Foundations of Committee Power
A number of ideas exist in the traditional legislative literature about the foun-86 1987 Foundations of Committee Power dations of committee power; some of these are at least a century old. A young legislative scholar in 1885, for example, characterized the veto power of congressional committees by referring to them as "dim dungeons of silence" (Wilson 1885, 69). As Bryce described it a few years later, "a bill comes before its committee with no presumption in its favour but rather as a shivering ghost stands before Minos in the nether world" (Bryce 1893, 157). At about the same time, the minority leader and soon-to-be Speaker of the House, Thomas Brackett Reed, emphasized another aspect of committee power -the advantages of information and expertise. He referred to the typical House committee as "the eye, the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the House. Freed from the very great inconvenience of numbers, it can study a question, obtain full information, and put the proposed legislation into shape for final action" (cited in MacNeil 1963, 149). A third important aspect of committee power is proposal power. Although employed only occasionally in the very first Congresses, the practice of referring bills to a standing committee and not debating them in the full House until reported by that committee evolved during the period of the Clay speakership (1811-25). By 1825 it had become standard operating procedure in the House; and in the twentieth century, with rare exception, bills originate in committee.
Taking some liberties, then, we may describe the foundation of committee power as consisting of gatekeeping, information advantage, and proposal power. Underlying these is a system of deference and reciprocity, according to which legislators defer to committee members by granting them extraordinary and differential powers in their respective policy jurisdictions.
What is amazing about these foundations of committee power is that nowhere are they carved in granite. Committees, as an empirical matter, are veto groups that may choose to keep the gates closed on a particular bill. But parliamentary majorities have recourse to mechanisms by which to pry the gates open, the discharge petition being only the most obvious. Why, then, do parliamentary majorities only rarely resort to such mechanisms? That is, why does the system of deference to committee veto judgments survive?
The question of survival also arises concerning information advantage and proposal power. As empirical matters, these are robust regularities. Yet the Speaker of a contemporary Congress is relatively free to break any alleged monopoly of proposal power held by committees through his right of recognition in House proceedings, his referral powers, his control of the Rules Committee, and his power to create ad hoc and select committees for specific purposes. Likewise, the contributions to information and expertise from the lobbyist denizens of Washington's "K Street Corridor" and an expanded congressional staff system mitigate the alleged informational advantages of committees.
Several reasons may be put forward to explain how a cooperative system of reciprocated deference is nevertheless sustained. The first and least persuasive is that no one ever has any reason to challenge it. The committee system and its division of labor, it might be alleged, are so successful in parceling work that anyone interested in a particular subject easily obtains membership on the committee that deals with it. Under these circumstances, deference becomes selfenforcing because there are no incentives to upset the applecart. Needless to say, this explanation denies or ignores interdependence among policy areas, fiscal dependencies, and the prospect that some issues-trade, energy, and health, for example-are not amenable to a neat division-of-labor arrangement because their incidences are both substantial and pervasive.
A second, related rationale to explain deference is not so sweeping. It suggests that while the matching up of work with interested members through committee assignments is not perfect, it is nevertheless sufficient to discourage violations of reciprocity (Shepsle 1978 ). This view, recently popularized in more general setting by Axelrod (1984) , argues that the long-term advantages of deference outweigh the occasional short-term disappointments and so serve to maintain the system.
To sum up, the argument for deference to committees claims that the benefits to be secured by violating deference and challenging a committee are either small (as in the first rationale) or not worth the costs (as in the second rationale). We believe this argument is incomplete and that its premises are not always plausible. There are, first of all, too many opportunities in which it is worthwhile to oppose (or to be seen to oppose) committee positions (Weingast and Marshall 1986) . Second, the terms of deference to committees are extremely vague. Third, the behavioral forms violations may take range from minor opposition (say, going on record as having some doubts about a committee bill) to major revolt (introducing a "killer" amendment or initiating a discharge petition). In short, the concepts of reciprocity and deference are at best convenient terms of discourse. Their very vagueness, combined with what we believe are frequent and compelling occasions in which a legislator will not wish to honor them, greatly reduces the power of self-enforcement as an explanation of committee power.
The puzzle of committee power remains. The idea of deference as a form of self-enforcing ex ante institutional bargain among legislators cannot account for the disproportionate influence of committees in their respective jurisdictions because it cannot explain away the temptations to defect from the bargain. To be persuasive, deference must be sustained by more explicit enforcement mechanisms. We discuss three such mechanisms that committees employ to bolster their institutional influence: (1) punishment, (2) ex ante defensive behavior, and (3) ex post defensive behavior.
A committee may discourage opposition to its actions (or nonactions) by developing a reputation for punishing those who oppose it. The current chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, a Chicago machine Democrat who knows how to keep score, was once reported to have said of a particularly obstructionist colleague, "I wouldn't support anything he wanted, even if the deal was for everlasting happiness" (personal interview). There is also the now classic story of the efforts by Senator James Buckley of New York to reduce the scale of the nefarious Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Bill. With the "help" of the Chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee, Buckley's assault on the pork barrel produced only one result-the striking of a project for the state of New York (Reeves 1974) . These anecdotes aside, it would appear that the capacity to punish and the general use of a tit-for-tat strategy by the committee provide precisely the basis for the emergence of the cooperative relationship between a committee and the rest of the parent chamber so elegantly described by Axelrod (1981 Axelrod ( , 1984 Having greatly qualified the significance of self-enforcing reciprocity as an explanation of committee power, we have sought more explicit enforcement mechanisms. We acknowledge a role for ex post punishment and ex ante defensive behavior. But neither strikes us as an entirely satisfactory enforcement mechanism because the conditions for the use of punishment are not met in all circumstances and ex ante defensive behavior accommodates the interests of others rather than enforcing a committee's own desires. There is, however, a third mechanism with which a committee maintains its dominance as veto group and primary policy proposer in its jurisdiction: ex post defensive behavior. We believe this to be the most potent enforcement mechanism and the least understood or appreciated.
Suppose a committee possessed an ex post veto. Suppose that, having molded a bill and reported it to its chamber and having allowed its chamber to "work its will," a committee could then determine whether or not to allow the bill (as amended, if amended) to become law (or, in a bicameral setting, to be transmitted to the other chamber). The ex post veto, we assert, is sufficient to make gatekeeping and proposal power effective, even though their effectiveness appears to most observers to be the product of nothing more than informal reciprocity arrangements.
Consider gatekeeping first. Suppose that some legislative majority could, by a discharge petition or some other bullyboy tactic, threaten to pry the gates open. If there were an ex post committee veto, then (aside from symbolic position taking) there would be little point to this sort of exercise. The ex post veto would ensure that changes in the status quo adverse to the interests of a decisive committee majority could be denied final passage. Indeed, the history of the discharge petition suggests precisely this. Even on those relatively rare occasions when a discharge petition obtained the necessary support (218 signatories), the bill of which the committee was discharged almost never became law. Now consider proposal power. Imagine a major amendment to a committee proposal favored by a chamber majority but opposed by a committee majority. The amendment might or might not pass, but surely even its most ardent proponents would have to consider whether the amendment were distasteful enough to the committee to trigger an ex post veto. The existence of an ex post veto would encourage the amendment proponents to work out a deal in advance with the committee, would lead to a pattern in which most successful amendments were supported by a committee majority as well as a chamber majority and, in those few instances where anticipation did not discourage amendments obnoxious to the committee, would trigger such a veto.
In the remainder of this paper, we explore in an analytical fashion the ex post veto as the enforcement mechanism that allows reciprocity and deference to work smoothly. Although our model is abstract and thus is consistent with any number of different operational forms of an ex post veto, we argue that the conference procedure, in which differences in legislation between the chambers of a bicameral legislature are resolved, provides the kind of forum in which committees get a "second crack" at a bill. We believe this kind of ex post enforcement mechanism clarifies and explains why various forms of cooperation work in legislatures such as the U.S. Congress despite their transparent fragility and vulnerability.
General Framework
We employ the well-known spatial model of committee decisions, so let us here briefly review its central ingredients. The legislature consists of n agents (N = {1, .. , n}), each possessing well-defined preferences (continuous and strictly quasiconvex) over the points of an m-dimensional Euclidean space. We assume the space is partitioned into policy jurisdictions: X, a k-dimensional subspace of Rm, is a typical jurisdiction. Similarly, we assume N is partitioned into committees, with C C N the committee whose jurisdiction is X. We shall assume that agent preferences are separable by jurisdiction so that we may focus exclusively on X. Thus, in X, agent i has ideal point xi and his or her preferences are representable by strictly convex indifference contours.' For any x e X, agent i's preferredto set is defined as In words, W(x) is the set of alternatives in X that command majority support over x. Finally, we denote a distinguished point, x4? e X, as the status quo. We note in passing the best known characteristic of the spatial pure majority rule model we have just described: for almost every configuration of preferences and any x e X, W(x) * 0. That is, except under highly unusual circumstances, no alternative is unbeatable. This property of win sets ensures that certain sets we describe below are nonempty.
We endow the committee C in jurisdiction X with certain agenda powers. Throughout we assume that C is a monopoly gatekeeper in X. No change in x0 may transpire unless C comes forth with a proposal. That is, C has ex ante veto power. Second, C has monopoly initiation power: (1) changes in x' in jurisdiction X must first be proposed by C; but, (2) once a proposal is made by C, competing proposals (normally in the form of amendments to Cs proposal) may be offered by others. Monopoly initiation power is proposal power under an open rule.
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Finally, a committee that may withdraw one of its proposals after it has undergone modification on the floor or that is empowered to modify further or reject such proposals in some other forum (say, in a conference proceeding with its counterpart in the other chamber of a bicameral legislature) is said to possess ex post veto power.
In describing the various agenda powers of committees, we have in mind a specific sequence of decision making in X. Committee C may initiate the legislative process by proposing a bill to alter the status quo, x0. Some potential proposal, x, may make a decisive committee majority worse off compared to x0, that is, x t PC(x0).3
In this case the committee will not bring forth the proposal but instead will exercise its ex ante veto power by keeping the gates closed.
If, on the other hand, there is a pro- An amendment like A, will actually be supported by the committee (A, E P,(B) n P,(xW)). Thus, it is entirely possible for a committee with gatekeeping and initiation powers to enhance its welfare, even in the absence of a closed rule. But there is nothing inevitable about it: while a committee might actively promote and support modifications like As, and ultimately accept modifications like A4, there is nothing to prevent amendments like A1, and there are strong incentives on the part of majority coalitions like {1,2} to push for them.
Ex Post Veto Power
Suppose now that a committee possessed ex post veto power in addition to gatekeeping and initiation powers. Once it has opened the gates and made a proposal and after the legislature has worked its will, either accepting the proposal or modifying it in some germane fashion, the committee now may either sanction the final product or restore the status quo, The ex post veto does not protect against amendments in the shaded regions containing A4 and A5 (see Figure ic) because the veto threat is no longer credible there. In these instances, the final outcome is still superior to x" in the committee's preferences. The committee may bluster, but it will not veto. Thus, some amendments (like A4) will pass despite committee opposition, and others (like As) will pass with committee support. These amendments turn out to be nonproblematical for committees, as we show in the next section.
There is one aspect of behavior induced by credible threats of ex post veto (such as the case of A1) that bears further discussion. As we related in the introductory section, much is made in the congressional literature of a system of reciprocated deference. But why is deference practiced at all? Is deference unqualified and honored always and everywhere? Our predictions provide a more discriminating explanation of this aspect of deference (or the appearance of it) than does the more traditional lore. In the case of an amendment like A1, Member 2 may appear to defer to the committee by voting against the amendment despite a sincere preference for it; indeed, Member 2 may rationalize his or her own behavior in this way. Thus, one might wish to label this behavior deference. But it should be clear that it is deference to the ex post veto power of the committee, not deference to expertise or an instance of reciprocal cooperation. In the absence of an ex post veto, we would not always expect to see deference by Member 2; rather, if the committee opened the gates in the first place, we would expect to see members 1 and 2 support an amendment like A1. Likewise, even with an ex post veto, there are some amendments to a committee bill (even some opposed by the committee) for which no deference at all will be observed. An amendment like A4, for example, will find majority support and no deference because the veto threat is not credible here. In our view deference is endogenous, is not everywhere applicable, and is most usefully thought of as a reflection of the strategic character of a situation. It is a property of a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982) .
In this light, the anomaly begging for explanation is not Member 2's counterintuitive, seemingly deferential behavior but rather why motions like A1 are ever made in the first place. We can allude to the symbolic position taking of Member 1 in moving A1, but this is surely not a very deep explanation. A more promising view incorporates the fact that agents, like Member 2, may not always be in a position to vote strategically (Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle 1985). In moving A1, Member 1 seeks to defeat B with a "killer amendment" that he or she knows will ultimately trigger a veto and the reinstatement of xe. Member 1 exploits Member 2's inability to cast a strategic (read: "deferential") vote. If Member 2 is not disabled in this way, then when A1 is moved and defeated, we believe strategic recognition of the ex post veto is an explanation superior to arguments about deference.
The discharge petition may be thought of in very similar terms. Suppose the original bill were A1 and assigned to the committee of Figure lb . Clearly, the committee's disposition is to keep the gates closed and not report A1. Since A1 e W(x?), a majority has an incentive to discharge the committee of its jurisdiction over this bill. Why, then, is the discharge mechanism rarely resorted to? And when it is employed, why does it rarely result in law? The ex post veto provides an explanation. Discharge petitions are often not worth the effort because of the strategic realities. While they get around the ex ante veto, they do not affect the ex post veto. So long as the committee gets to take a crack at the bill after its chamber has worked its will, it is in a strong position to affect the course of its chamber's deliberations. Once again, it is strategic calculation, not deference, that provides the more compelling explanation.6
Institutionalization of the Ex Post Veto: Conference Committees
In the United States Congress, as in most state legislatures, a bill must pass both chambers of the legislature in precisely the same form before it may be sent to the chief executive for his signature. Should a bill pass in different forms in the two chambers, a process is set in motion to reconcile differences.7 After the second chamber has acted on a bill, the first chamber may "concur" in the second chamber's amendments. If, instead, the first chamber "disagrees" with the second chamber's amendments (or concurs in those amendments with further amendments of its own), then the second chamber may "recede" from its original amendments (or concur in the first chamber's new amendments). Or it may, in turn, concur in the first chamber's new amend-94 1987 Foundations of Committee Power ments with its own new amendments, putting the ball back in the first chamber's court. Although this process, known as messaging between the chambers, cannot continue indefinitely, the bill can be sent back and forth several more times in the hope that one of the chambers will accept the final position of the other. However, once a stage of disagreement is reached in which one chamber "insists" on its version of the bill and the other chamber disagrees, then one chamber requests a conference, and the other chamber accepts. While as many as three-fourths of all public laws manage to avoid the conference stage, nearly all major bills-appropriations, revenue, and important authorizations-end up in conference.
There is now a considerable body of rules and commentary on conference proceedings.8 Conferees of each chamber (also called managers) are appointed by the presiding officer; these appointments come principally from the committees of jurisdiction at the suggestion of those committees' chairpersons (some evidence is provided below). Occasionally an additional conferee is appointed to represent a particular amendment that the presiding officer (in the House) believes will not otherwise be fairly represented (like Al in Figure 1) ; but even in this exceptional case, the views of the committee chairpersons are dominant.9 The conferees from each chamber seek to resolve differences in the respective versions of the bill, and an agreement is said to be reached when a majority of each delegation signs the conference report.'0 If both sign, the report and accompanying bill containing the agreement are brought back to each chamber to be voted up or down (no amendments are in order). That is, the conference report is considered under a closed rule as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal." The conference procedure, described in simplified fashion in the preceding two paragraphs, thus does two things. First, it institutionalizes the ex post veto and, as described in the previous sections, gives credibility to the committee during floor deliberations in its chamber. Second, to the extent that there is some discretion on the part of conferees on the terms to which they may agree (see below), the take-it-or-leave-it treatment of conference reports confers additional ex post adjustment power on the committee. It is to this latter consideration that we now proceed.
We begin with the jurisdiction X, which we assume is common to both the House and the Senate, and the status quo x0 e X. The respective conferees take F(x') as a constraint and seek a negotiated settlement, say B*, consistent with that constraint. This normally requires a compromise in which the preferences of each chamber (as reflected in BH and Bs respectively) are to some degree sacrificed. Indeed, in Figure 2 , the committees sacrifice as well, agreeing on an outcome less preferred to them than their respective chamber's bills. Different configurations of preferences, however, need not have this property.
In the empirical literature on conference committees, much is made of who "wins" in conference (Fenno 1966; Ferejohn 1975; Strom and Rundquist 1977; Vogler 1970) . Sometimes the outcome is closer to the House position, sometimes closer to the Senate position, and sometimes it entails splitting the differences between the chamber positions. From Figure 2 it is clear that such outcomes cannot be attributed entirely to relative bargaining skills or to which chamber acted first (explanations common in the literature). The nonconvexity of F(x0) means that some compromises are infeasible (they may lie outside FxP]). Moreover, the ultimate compromise, B*, may well lie closer to one bill than to the other, or closer to one committee's ideal than to the other's. But once again this cannot be attributed entirely to relative bargaining advantages since the relative locations of F(x0), PH(x?), and Ps(x0) will restrict the feasible set of agreements. In Figure 2 , B* is about equidistant from the Senate committee's and the House committee's ideal. But it constitutes the best the House committee could hope for, given the constraints, whereas the Senate might have done better. In general, the configuration of chamber 96 1987 Foundations of Committee Power preferences and of conferee preferences will determine the feasible bargaining range.
While the task of modeling conference proceedings falls under the rubric of future research, there are two more insights we can offer, one on equilibrium and the other on comparative statics. In Figure 3 , B* is the negotiated conference agreement (from Figure 2) between HC and SC. It lies on their contract locus and is an element of F(xO) (not pictured). There is no reason, however, to believe that chamber majorities are content with B*. Since B * e F(x") and since it comes back to each chamber under a closed rule, it will pass. But it is entirely possible that F(B*) * 0, as shown in Figure 3 . Nonetheless, in these circumstances B * is now an equilibrium. Since PH(B*) fl PS(B*) = 0 (i.e., B* is on the HC-SC contract locus), the set inequality is violated so that despite clamoring from both chambers for change, none will be forthcoming. For every proposed change in B *, at least one of the conference delegations will exercise its ex post veto. Any such proposal will die in conference.
Our model also yields important comparative statics results. An equilibrium point, that is, a status quo point for which the set inequality is violated, will be upset by exogenous changes in committee composition (but not by changes in chamber composition not affecting committee composition as well). In Figure 3 , if the Senate committee's ideal shifts from SC to SC', an entirely new contract locus is traced out, and B * is no longer in equilibrium. This suggests two nonobvious comparative statics implications. First, the ex ante and ex post vetoes of committees may neutralize even dramatic changes in chamber composition, slowing if not blunting altogether the tracking of policy with popular preferences. Second, committee composition changes, even if restricted to only one chamber, have a disequilibrating effect. Thus, as Weingast 
Committee Dominance of the Conference
In order for committees of jurisdiction to possess an ex post veto, they must dominate conference committee delegations. On the basis of the reports of early students of the subject (unfortunately, without much in the way of supporting evidence), such dominance has been the case for more than a century (Rogers 1922; McCown 1927 A further perusal of the data on which Table 1 is based yields additional impressions, though we will not attach any quantitative weight to them here. First, it is almost always the case that the chairperson and the ranking minority member of the full committee from which the bill originated serve on the conference. Second, it is extremely rare for a conference to produce an agreement to which these two persons are not signatories; it 98 happens on occasion (for example, Chairman Hatfield did not sign several Appropriations conference reports), but we hesitate to draw any conclusions from these events for they are likely to involve contextual details that are not available without in-depth study of the particular cases. Third, there is considerable evidence that, in addition to full committee chair and ranking minority member, the subcommittees responsible for the bill dominate the conference delegation (see below for some additional details).
Committee dominance at the conference stage is perhaps the most complete and certainly the most obvious in our data in the area of appropriations. Moreover, the decentralization to the subcommittee level within each appropriations committee that Fenno (1966) described twenty years ago is clearly evident at the conference stage as well. In Table 2 we display the evidence for this claim for all appropriations measures (omnibus bills excepted) in 1981, 1982, and 1983. Subcommittee autonomy is said to be complete in conference if all the members (and only all the members) serve as managers. Subcommittees are dominant when either one subcommittee member was excluded from the conference or a nonsubcommittee member was included. Since the former circumstance may often arise with no political weight attached (e.g., a Senator is out of town; a Representative is ill) and the latter occurred on only a single occasion, most of the dominant autonomy occurrences are hardly different from their complete autonomy counterparts. Finally, partial autonomy arises when more than one subcommittee member is deleted from conference. As the evidence suggests, subcommittees of both appropriations committees not only take full responsibility within their respective chambers for marking up appropriations measures and managing them on the floor but the same (relatively small) group of legislators meets year after year to hammer out a final compromise.
As a final bit of empirical corroboration, we have taken a sample of conferences by legislative committees from the 1981-83 period to see the extent to which the subcommittee autonomy evidenced in the appropriations realm carries over to other types of legislation. The results appear in Table 3 . Of the 71 legislative committee conferences from the 1981-83 period, we examined the composition of 27 to see the extent to which the subcommittee of jurisdiction dominated the conference delegation. The evidence of subcommittee influence here, while not as overwhelming as in the appropriations realm, is nevertheless con- 
Discussion
We have sought to offer a more discriminating notion of committee veto power, to embed in in a decision making sequence, and thereby to provide a firmer explanatory foundation for committee power than has been provided heretofore. Our theoretical examples and the accompanying figures illustrate the methodological tools and suggest the lines of what is a fairly general argument. Of central importance is the role of sequence. It matters, for example, whether veto power comes first (as in gatekeeping) or at the penultimate stage (as in conference proceedings). An undiscriminating treatment of committee agenda power that fails to distinguish between different sequential properties of that power is often misleading.
In emphasizing sequence and explicit enforcement arrangements, we do not intend to deprecate the ideas of selfenforcing agreements, implicit cooperation, and deference that have constituted traditional stock-in-trade explanations for committee power. Surely, all of these operate. Moreover, our focus on ex post enforcement is in no way inconsistent with the fact that many participants might themselves explain their behavior as essentially deferential. It would not surprise us to find most legislators saying, "Sure, I let those people over on Education and Labor do pretty much what they think is reasonable. And they do the same for us on Armed Services. That's the way things are done around here." We would only claim that "deference" labels a behavioral regularity; it does not explain it. The theoretical question of interest is why that behavior is an equilibrium. We have, in effect, sought to give deference a rational basis by embedding it in the strategic realities produced by the sequence of decision making.15
Much work, both theoretical and empirical, remains to be done. In the body of this paper, we have only hinted at the broader generality of our argument. A first-order priority is to specify theoretical conditions more explicitly and generally. Second, we need to understand committee strategies better. What is the optimal markup vehicle that a committee takes to the floor (see Shepsle and Weingast 1981) ? What amendments will committee members themselves seek to offer on the floor?
To what extent do committees (party leaders, backbenchers) anticipate the conference stage, and how do these expectations and forecasts affect their prior floor behavior? Third, we have given little attention to the strategic opportunities available to noncommittee members. Given the partial control by committees, what strategies may noncommittee members pursue to influence committee legislation? Finally, how might we properly model the conference itself, the objectives of the participants, and the constraints imposed upon them? These are all theoretical questions upon which our methodology may be brought to bear.
Empirically, there is a good deal of qualitative description and quantitative work in the legislative literature on some aspects of the problems we have presented in this paper. Most of it, however, is not tied to a theoretical framework; and, as we pointed out earlier, it is not at all obvious to us that the main preoccupation of this literature-namely, the question, who wins in conference?-is at all illuminating. Conferees are constrained by what will pass their respective chambers and this in turn determines the feasible set of agreements conferees may reach. The evidence presented in the previous section on committee (subcommittee) autonomy suggests an even more persuasive reason for doubting the relevance of this question. The conference may be less an arena for bicameral conflict than one in which kindred spirits from the two chambers get together to hammer out a mutually acceptable deal. Surely on some (many?) subjects-for example, commodity price supports-the members of the House and Senate subcommitteess who control the conference have more in common with one another than either may have with fellow chamber members.
In our analytical approach to legislative institutions, we have focused on the locus and sequence of agenda power. In characterizing legislative decision making in terms of who may make proposals (motions, amendments), and in what order, and who may exercise veto power and in what order, we wish to emphasize that these features are not merely the minutiae of parliamentarians. Rather, they provide the building blocks from which legislative institutions are constructed. The results presented here and by others elsewhere show that different mixes of these institutional building blocks lead to different outcomes and, correspondingly, to significantly different political behavior.
In the context of the committee system in the U.S. Congress, we showed that proposal power and ex ante veto power are insufficient to the task of institutionalizing an effective division-of-labor arrangement. In the absence of some form of ex post veto power, committee proposals are vulnerable to alteration and, because of this, committees have agenda control in only a very truncated form. It is unlikely, in our view, that such a shaky foundation would induce individuals to invest institutional careers in the committees on which they serve.
Although our analysis focused on the U.S. Congress and the manner in which the ex post veto is institutionalized there, it should be clear that our approach is more general. Because it can, in principle, be used to study any sequence of agenda control, it can be applied to institutions that differ significantly from Congress. Thus, we would conjecture more generally that bicameral legislatures in which committees are not the central actors in resolving differences between the chambers will not possess strong committees, ceteris paribus.
It is in this regard that the British Parliament is of some interest. The method of resolving differences between two chambers of a bicameral legislature is of British invention. The earliest recorded evidence of its practice comes from fourteenth century England. But in England, as Rogers (1922, 301-2) observes,
